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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we miinic  an engiiieeriilg  approacli to the "production"  of tax 
offices. Essentially one dominant physical input (labour) is converted into hete- 
rogeneous non-monetary outputs such as the number of audited returns with a 
different degree of complexity. 
Productive efficiency is evaluated against a best practice frontier using the 
non-parametric  Free  Disposal  (FDH)  iiiethod  and  Data  E~iveloplnent 
Analysis (DEA). We first calculate efficiency measures for 289 regional tax offi- 
ces, responsible for the personal income tax in Belgium. Next we explain the 
differences in efficiency scores in tem~s  of characteristics related to managerial 
skillsicult~~re  and organizational structures. 
" Financial support from the Belgian National Science Foundation (FDWTCA-PEIOl1001) 
is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to the Ministry of Finance for providing the data 
and Lucy Anlez and Tom Van Puyenbroeck for computational help. I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal stress, both at the level of national and local governments, has 
spurred a renewed interest among economists in the measurement of 
the productive efficiency of public administrations. Public agencies 
typically supply multiple outputs with heterogeneous inputs. Quite 
often the exact knowledge of the underlying production technology is 
rather weak. The construction of a non-parametric production frontier 
may then offer a solution. 
Since the seminal paper of Farrell (1957) a substantial strand of 
axiomatic literature has treated the measurement  of productive  effi- 
ciency (see e.g. Fare, Groskopf and Lovell (1985)). An illuminating 
comparison of non-parametric with parametric estimation of technical 
efficiency in service production  is provided  in Bjurek, Hjalmarsson 
and Forsund (1990). It is interesting to note that the practical tools for 
efficiency measurement have been supplied by the field of operational 
research. Applying linear programming techniques Charnes, Cooper 
and Rhodes ((1978),  (1981))  have developed  a method,  which  is 
widely known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In recent years 
Tulkens et al. ((1986), (1988)) have complemented this approach with 
the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method. Common to both methods is 
the ambition to construct a production  surface, which encompasses 
the actually observed best practices as close as possible. The degree 
of efficiency of any particular observation is then measured as the 
radial distance from this best practice frontier. 
At the empirical level these methods (primarily DEA) have been 
extensively applied for the estimation of the efficiency scores of indi- 
vidual production units (cross-section) in various areas such as: health 
services, education, public transportation, post offices, municipalities, 
banking, insurance, . .  . (for an overview of empirical work both in the 
public and private sector, see Gulledge and Lovell (1992)). 
On the contrary, at the revenue  side of the government  sector, 
empirical studies on the productive efficiency of tax offices seem to 
be rather rare. Although efficiency of the tax administration is one of 
the four "canons" recommended by Adain Smith (1776) in his long- 
standing treatise on taxation. Moreover, one notices that economists 
are more interested in the empirical investigation of individual com- 
pliance  costs of taxation  rather than the measurement of the opera- 
tional efficiency of existing tax administrations (see Sandford, Godwin 
and Hardwick (1989); Slemrod (1992). Apparently,  DEA and FDH have not yet been applied for an investigation of the relative efficiency 
of individual tax offices. 
The purpose of this study is to measure and explain the differences 
in productive efficiency of individual tax offices. The sample covers 
the totality of regional tax offices, belonging to the Finance Ministry 
in Belgium and responsible for the personal income tax. On average 
43 pct. of total national tax revenue is raised by the personal income 
tax, which makes it the most important single form of taxation in 
Belgium. These offices audit the tax returns, perform controls in loco, 
calculate  the  increases  in the tax  base  for the underdeclarations, 
impose fines.. .  . For these multiple outputs they employ one dominant 
input, which is labour. 
Both the DEA and FDH method will be applied for the estimation 
and interpretation of the efficiency scores. To control for the sensitivity 
of the estimates we add an exercise to eliminate the outliers follow- 
ing a procedure outlined in Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). As a fur- 
ther step we also want to explain the differences in efficiency taking 
into  account  scale, managerial  and  organizational  characteristics. 
There we use the Tobit censored regression model. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The FDH and DEA methods 
are presented in section 11. The data sources are discussed in section 111. 
In the next section IV the efficiency results are reported and inter- 
preted. Section V analyses the sensitivity of the results. An explana- 
tion  of the efficiency indicators is given in section VI. Section V11 
draws some conclusions. 
11.  METHODOLOGY 
Consider a tax office as a production unit or, in general tenns as a 
decision making unit (DMU). Productive efficiency is achieved by a 
DMU if an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one 
other output or an increase in at least one input; and if a reduction in 
any input requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduc- 
tion in at least one output (Koopmans (195 1)). Thus efficiency is rep- 
resented by the  attainment  of Pareto  optimality, which  is usually 
labelled as Pareto-Koopnians optimality. 
An appropriate benchmark is required to assess the productive effi- 
ciency of a DMXJ  in coinparison with the performance of other DW's 
in the same branch. The original article by Farrell (1957) introduced the concept of the best practice reference frontier. Based on actual 
observations, this frontier specifies for a DMU the maximum quanti- 
ties of outputs it can produce given any level of inputs and, for any 
levels of outputs, the minimum quantities of inputs it needs for pro- 
ducing. Consequently, efficient obseivations will be positioned on the 
best practice frontier. Fassell also has developed an indicator of effi- 
ciency that measures the distance of inefficient observatioils from the 
best practice frontier. For example, in the case of input efficiency one 
searches for the maximum scalar wise reduction of all inputs yielding 
the same output. In terns of isoquant analysis, input efficiency is mea- 
sured along a ray through the origin. Fassell's efficiency measure has 
been  extensively  applied  in  economic  literat~~re  (see  e.g.  Fare, 
Grosskopf and Love11 (1985)). 
To determine the best practice frontier, we use two non-parametric 
methods. The first one is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which 
originates in the works of Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes ((1978), (1981)). 
The efficiency of each decision making unit is obtained as the maxi- 
mum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the 
constraint that the similar ratios for every DMU be less than or equal 
to one. This amounts to the following linear programming problem, 
which must be solved for each DMU: 
subject to: 
The particular DMU being evaluated is identified by subscript 0; all 
other are denoted by j (j  = l ,. . .g).  The inaxiinuin of the objective fi~nc- 
tion, hO,  is the DEA efficiency score assigned to DMU,.  Each DMU 
uses an m-dimensional input vector, X,  (i = l,.  . .,m), to produce  an s-dimensional output vector, y, (r = l,.  . .,S),  U,  and v,  are the output and 
input weights respectively and constitute the variables of the problem. 
This non-linear problem  can be transformed to a tractable linear 
prograinming problein (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978)). For 
computational purposes, this model inay be replaced with its equiva- 
lent dual formulation: 
nl  S 
Min  ho=z,-~xS,--~CS,+ 
l =l  I- =l 
subject to 
An arbitrarily small positive number, introduced to ensure that all 
of the observed inputs and outputs have positive values and that the 
optimal value h0 is not affected by the values assigned to the so-called 
"slack-variables"  (S; +S,-)  and. The latter variables are associated with 
the input and output inequalities. If they have any positive  compo- 
nents then it is possible to increase the outputs or reduce the inputs 
without violating any constraint. 
DEA comprises several models  depending  on  the  assumptions 
which are made about the nature of the returns to scale. The variable 
returns to scale condition (DEA-V) occurs if Ch = 1.  No restriction on 
Ch  corresponds to allowiilg only constant returns to scale. 
The second approach was developed by Deprins, Simar and Tulltens 
(1984) and is referred to as the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method. 
FDH only rests on the assumptions of strong disposability of outputs 
and free disposability of inputs. The latter assumption rules out that 
an increase in inputs results in a decrease in outputs. Strong dispos- 
ability of outputs implies that any reduction in outputs remains pro- 
ducible with the same amount of inputs. 
To calculate the individual efficiency measure of each DMU a data 
classification algorithm based  on vector  dominance reasoning  can 
be used. It proceeds  as  follows. Each observation  is  sequentially compared to all others. A DMU is declared inefficient if it is possible 
to find another observation, which produces the same, or more outputs 
with strictly less of at least one input, or which uses the same or less 
inputs to produce  strictly more of at least one output. In this sense 
they are dominated by at least one other observation. Input-output 
combinations which are undominated, are declared efficient. DMU's 
which are efficient but which never dominate another observation are 
called "efficient by default". More formally, to calculate individual 
efficiency measures the linear programming problem mentioned before 
can be used, adding the condition that hj E {0,1}  . 
Figure 1 illustrates the FDH and DEA-V best practice frontier and 
the radial efficiency measure for the two inputs-one output case. The 
full dots represent actual input combinations which produce the same 
output. The solid and dotted line represent the DEA-V and FDH best 
practice frontier respectively. 
In the FDH setting the three DMU's a, b and c are declared efficient 
and shape the stepwise best practice frontier. These three DMU's are 
not dominated by any other observation. Moreover, DMU a is declared 
efficient by default as a does not dominate any other DMU. DMU b 
dominates four other observations and DMU c dominates five other 
DMU's. DMU k is dominated both by b and c, but the best practice 
reference is identified as c. This follows from the radial distance mea- 
sure which calculates the input efficiency score of DMU k by the ratio 
ok"1ok. 
Within the framework of DEA-V the best practice frontier is repre- 
sented by the solid line. In this reasoning only two DMU's, i.e. a and 
c, are considered to be technically efficient. For observation k the input 
efficiency will be lower as it is now measured by the ratio ok'lok. 
Generally speaking the FDH method yields the more generous ref- 
erence frontier as FDH encompasses the actual data as close as pos- 
sible. Under FDH there will be a larger number of efficient DMU's, 
but also the individual efficiency scores of the inefficient DMU's will 
be higher than under DEA-V. 
One of tlze  attractive points  of the FDH reference frontier is its 
strong intuitive appeal. Inefficiencies  are calculated in comparison 
with actually observed input-output combinations. From a manage- 
ment point of view this enhances the credibility of this approach when 
compared with other methods where inefficiencies are calculated with 
respect to a hypothetical point on the best practice frontier (see De 
Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste (1994)). FIGURE 1 
Input eficiency for FDH and DEA- V 
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A major consideration is the sensitivity to outliers. It can be argued 
that this sensitivity increases with the number of assumptions that are 
imposed on the best practice frontier. Consequently, in comparison 
with other non-parametric methods, the FDH reference technology 
will be the least sensitive to the presence of outliers. A second com- 
ment relates to the impact of both the number of observations and the 
number  of  input  and output  dimensions  considered  in  the  FDH- 
approach. An increase in the input and output dimensions increases the 
probability of efficiency, since the probability of being dominated over 
all dimensions decreases. Increasing the sample size on the other hand, 
increases the possibility of dominance and therefore the probability of 
being declared inefficient (Tulkens (1986)). 
Finally, discontinuities in the best practice frontier can lead to major 
differences in calculated measures of inefficiency even though obser- 
vations have more or less the same input-output structure. 
111.  DATA 
In Belgium, the data concerning the activities of the tax offices are col- 
lected by the Ministry of Finance. After the final audit of a tax return, each audit officer registers his activities in detail. The individual reports 
are aggregated on a monthly basis for each tax office. This results in 
output data such as the number of audited retunls, the number of under- 
declarations, the number of control visits in loco, fines, . . .  . 
Time and effort to audit a tax return vary considerably across cat- 
egories. Wage-earners  typically file a return which is less coinplex 
than the tax declaration of independent professionals who itemise their 
incurred expenses (see e.g. Frompton (1993)). Fortunately, the Belgian 
statistics report for each tax office separately the inore routine-type 
returns of category A and the inore co~nplex  returns of category B. 
To take account of the "quality" of the audit we like to add, for each 
category, the number of audits that lead to an increase in the tax base. 
The main inputs are labour, capital and materials. Wages  are the 
dominant cost component ainounting to 80 pct. of the total operating 
costs. For the present study we could only obtain data on personnel, 
expressed in full-time equivalents. However, common administration 
standards make the allocation  of office space and equipment (com- 
puter terminals, furniture, . . .) to a large extent proportional to labour 
input. 
In the remainder of this paper, the following variables are used: 
Output: -  the number of audited returns of category A; 
-  the number of audited returns of category A that lead 
to an increase in the tax base; 
-  the number of audited returns of category B; 
-  the number of audited returns of category B that lead 
to an increase in the tax base. 
Inpzit:  personnel, expressed in full-time equivalents. 
In Belgium the audit of the returns for the personal income tax is 
carried out by  313 regional tax offices. Incompleteness of the data 
forces us to restrict the investigation to 289 tax offices. The data refer 
to the fiscal year 1991, recorded at the 30th  of June 1992. 
A summary of the data is presented in Table 1. Taken together the 
289 tax offices employ 2,815 people, auditing some 354,400 returns 
of category A and 534,600 returns of category B. For the inore coin- 
plex B-type returns one out of three retunls leads to an expansion of 
the tax base. This is only 12 pct. for the more routine-type A-returns. 
On  average  an audit  office  has  a  staff  of  9  to  10  fdl-time 
employees, treating 1,226 A-returns and 1,850 B-returns. This amounts 
to a "productivity" per employee of 126 A-returns and 190 B-returns. TABLE l 
Descriptive statistics 
Output  Input 
Nuinber of  Increases  Number of  Increases 
audited  in the tax  audited  in the tax 
return  base  return  base 
Category A  Category A  Category B  Category B  Personnel 
Total  354,393.00  42,303.00  534,603.00  177,033.00  2,814.50 
Max  10,256.00  1,234.00  354,393.00  42,303.00  66.00 
Min  56.00  2.00  670.00  90.00  2.00 
Average  1,266.27  146.38  1,849.84  612.57  9074 
Standard  964.16  151.07  655.10  28 1.24  5.35 
edivation 
FIGURE 2 
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The dispersion in input and output size between the regional audit 
offices is rather substantial. For each variable the standard deviation 
is reported in Table l.  The distance between the maxiinuin and mini- 
inuin observation is huge. However for the input size this discrepancy 
is largely due to loutlier at the bottom and 2 outliers at the top of the 
sample distribution. This observation is confirmed in Figure 2 where 
the size distribution is shown. TABLE 2 
Size distn~butiorz  of otrtputs 
Number of audited returns category A  Number of audited returns category B 
Scale  Distribution  Scale  Distribution 
The size distribution of outputs is presented in Table 2. It appears 
that  in small size offices the  audit of A-type returns is dominant, 
whereas the relative share of B-type returns increases for the medium 
and larger audit offices. 
IV.  RESULTS 
For each tax office (DMU) the efficiency score was calculated fol- 
lowing the FDH-method and the DEA-method assuming both vari- 
able and constant returns to scale. The efficiency measure indicates 
the relative radial distance from the DMU to the best practice fron- 
tier. An index equal to one means that the tax office is, relatively 
speaking, technically efficient. A measure less than one indicate the 
degree of inefficiency. An equiproportional  increase of the outputs 
by the inverse of the efficiency score minus one would convert the 
DMU into an efficient office. For instance DMU 2 has an efficiency 
score of 0.88. The inverse of 0.88 minus one equals 0.14. This means TABLE 3 
EfJiciency  scores 
FDH  DEA-V  DEA-F 
Nuinber of efficient DMU's  99.00  21.00  10.00 
Max  1  .OO  1  .OO  1  .OO 
Min  0.29  0.24  0.22 
Average 
Standard deviation 
that DMU 2 should raise its outputs by  14 pct. in order to achieve 
efficiency. 
The FDH frontier constitutes the closest envelope of the actual data. 
DEA-V takes an intermediate position, whereas DEA-F represents a 
Inore "remote"  frontier. Consequently FDH will find more DMU's 
efficient when compared to DEA-V and DEA-F. The results of Table 3 
confirm these inferences. It appears that under FDH 99 DMU's  are 
declared efficient, i.e. 34.3 pct. of the sample. The number of efficient 
DMU's decreases to 2 1 (i.e. 7.3 pct. of the observations) under DEA-V. 
Only  10 tax offices remain also efficient under the strictest version 
of DEA-F. These are the DMU's: 15, 27, 65, 133, 134, 185, 225, 255, 
256 and 275. The average efficiency score of 0.85 is rather high for 
FDH, but decreases to 0.70 and 0.60 for DEA-V and DEA-F respec- 
tively. The lowest individual efficiency measure varies between 0.22 
for DEA-F and 0.29 for FDH. 
Although the standard deviation of 0.16 happens to be the same for 
each method, there is a remarkable difference in the distribution of the 
efficiency scores. Figure 4 represents, for each of the three methods, 
this frequency distribution. As expected the shape is extremely fat 
tailed for the more generous FDH-method. 
V.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
As mentioned before, FDH and DEA are non-parametric methods that 
use linear programming techniques to determine the best practice fron- 
tier. This has the clear advantage that a priori no functional form has 
to be specified. On the other hand, these deterministic methods  are 
sensitive to outliers in the data. FIGURE 3 
Thefieque~lcy  distl-ibzrtion of efjciencj,  scoles 
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Efficiency  score 
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40 
Efficiency score 
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Efficiency  score In this section we tiy to investigate the sensitivity of the DEA-V 
results to the presence of outliers. Therefore we eliminate the outliers 
from our main data set of 289 tax offices using one of the procedures 
outlined in Belsley, KLI~  and Welsch (1980). This technique constructs 
a test statistic based on the so-called  leverage value h, =.w,(X'X)-'X, of 
each observation. The leverage value determines the importance of 
the observation in the space spanned by all dimensions in the data set. 
Use of the appropriate test statistic resulted in the detection of 17 out- 
liers. From these outliers 11 were declared efficient in the original 
analysis. 
We  repeated the calculation  of the DEA-V efficiency scores now 
based on the data set obtained after deleting the 17 outliers. Dropping 
the outliers resulted in a marginal increase in the average (from 0.70 
to 0.74) and minimum (from 0.24 to 0.27) efficiency measure. The 
number of technically efficient tax offices remained the same. 
The correlation and rank correlation coefficients indicated a value 
of 0.93, which leads us to conclude that outliers have little impact on 
the efficiency measures and that, from this point of view, the results 
can be  considered  as fairly stable. Consequently  we will  use  the 
DEA-V efficiency estimates of the original analysis as the left hand 
variable in the explanatory model of the next section. 
VI.  EXPLAINING PRODUCTIVE INEFFICIENCIES 
The objective of this section is to investigate which variables do influ- 
ence the efficiency level of the tax offices. An  appropriate model to 
explain efficiency differences should take account of the characteristics 
of the distribution of these efficiency measures. Efficiency scores larger 
than one are not observed, meaning that the dependent variable is right 
censored. Consequently, ordinary least squares will result in inconsis- 
tent coefficient estimates. A model that acconunodates the specific char- 
acteristics of the distribution of the efficiency measures is the Tobit 
censored regression model, which can be defined in the following way: where u is assumed to be normally distributed. The latent variable Y* 
is not directly observable. Its observed counterpart is the efficiency 
index Y,  which is censored at the limit level of 1, thus making the true 
value of Y*. For Y* less than one both Y and X are observed while 
for Y* > 1, X is observed and Y equals the limit value of 1. 
When the efficiency score is less than one, t = (Y -  P'X) I o  = y 1 o 
has the standard normal distribution with density hnction 
and cumulative distribution function 
For efficient DMU's it is known that Y* > 1 or P'X + 1. This term is 
equal to ylo > (1 -  P'X)/o with probability function 
Consequently, the likelihood function of the Tobit model is as follows: 
Maximising this likelihood function with respect to and will result in 
the required parameter estimates. 
One would expect that managerial and organizational characteris- 
tics do have an effect on the efficiency degree of tax offices. In fact 
some tax offices are managed by a high ranking public servant who 
has the required qualifications. But in the last decade it has been dif- 
ficult to attract and keep qualified personnel as the prospects in the 
business  sector were more rewarding. This has led to a shortage of 
high ranking administrators. As a consequence some tax offices are 
managed by less experienced and qualified civil servants. The man- 
agement position is captured by a dummy TITU which has the value 
one if the person in charge has the required qualifications. The inter- 
nal monitoring of a tax office may also be reflected in the number of fines (FINE) and the number of official assessments (OFFIC), which 
are associated with its "eagerness".  The number of control visits in 
loco (LOCO) is somewhat ambiguous since it represents a trade-off 
between quality and quantity of the audit. Nevertheless a positive sign 
is expected, as for all the other managerial variables, which soinehow 
refer to more dynamic management of the daily operations. 
There are also differences at the organizational level. Some tax 
offices benefit from the services of a Central Tax Office (CTO), while 
other do not have the same facilities. A CTO provides the automatic 
handling of several aspects of a tax file, which leaves room for inore 
and better audits. A dummy variable CTO is introduced to capture the 
existence of a Central Tax Office. The 313 tax offices are regrouped 
into thirteen geographical directorates. Some directorates are reputed 
to have a better management culture and cohesion. Other directorates 
suffer from a higher turnover of personnel. This is e.g. the case in the 
Brussels area where most of the civil servants get their training before 
they are appointed as an audit officer in the province. A duinmy vari- 
able is allocated to twelve directorates (DIRI, .  . ., DIR12). 
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 4. Taking a signif- 
icance level of 10 pct., the critical value for the chi-square is 2.7. 
It appears that the influence of organizational characteristics can not 
be neglected. The availability of a Central Tax Office (CTO) increases 
the efficiency score as expected. Six out of thirteen directorates seem 
to affect the performance of their tax offices. It helps to belong to 
directorate number 6 (DIR6). On the other hand, one observes a lower 
performance in the directorates number 1,3,4,8 and 9.The coefficients 
of the  other directorates  (DIR2, DIR5, DIR7, DIR10, DIRll and 
DIR12) are not significantly different from zero. 
Let us now examine the impact of the managerial variables. The 
efficiency score is highly related to the position of a qualified man- 
ager (TITU). Also the number of fines (FINE) is positively related to 
the degree of efficiency. However, the number of official assessments 
(OFFIC) is hardly significant. The zeal of a tax office, as reflected in 
the number of control visits in loco (LOCO), has also a positive influ- 
ence. 
Finally we also wanted to investigate whether the efficiency score 
is systematically related to the scale of the tax office. As a scale vari- 
able we selected the number of people liable for the personal income 
tax per tax office (LIATAX). The impact seems negligible which is in 
sharp contrast with the conclusion of another empirical study on the TABLE 4 
Deter'lninal7ts of  technical eficiency: Tobit reszrlts 




















Log Likelihood for nolnlal distribution: -  1088.97 
perfonllance of tax offices responsible for the business income tax in 
Belgiunl (Ainez and Moesen (1994)). There it was found that the effi- 
ciency estimates are positively related to the scale of the tax office. 
It turns out that in the larger tax offices it is feasible that the auditors 
specialize in the control of certain branches  such as banking or the 
petro-chemical industry. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In their agenda for research on determining organizational effective- 
ness  Lewin  and  Minton  identify  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  as 
". . . a promising inatheinatic  .  . . to be potentially  useful for relating 
organizational designs to organizational effectiveness" (Lewin and Minton (1986), p. 532). In the public sector it is tempting to relate the 
operational performance, either measured by DEA or FDH, to orga- 
ilizational  structures such as governnlent versus private ownership, 
different forms of contracting out or the regulatory environment (for 
an overview see e.g. Pestieau and Tulkens (1993)). 
In this study we focus on the non-parametric measurement of the 
productive  efficiency  of tax  offices. We  mimic  an  "engineering" 
approach to tax auditing where physical inputs are converted into non- 
monetary outputs; i.e. the number of tax audits and the number of cor- 
rectiolls  for under-declarations  for the two major categories of tax 
files. At the side of the output indicators we have omitted the tax pro- 
ceeds to mitigate the influence of environmental differences. In fact, 
variatiens ir, regi=na!  ~:,.~a!th  =f the taxpayers cGu!d ther, bias 
the estimates. 
It still appears that some tax  offices perforin substantially better 
than others. Our investigation reveals that organizational designs do 
matter such as the presence of a Central Tax Office and to a lesser 
degree  the  monitoring  system  within  each  Regional  Directorate 
General. Of equal importance is the positive  impact of managerial 
sltills. Offices which are daily managed by a qualified (higher rank- 
ing) civil servant seem to perform better on average. Which is an argu- 
ment for investinent in human capital also in the public sector. 
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